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Abstract 
Purpose:  To provide a critique of Bent Flyybjerg’s work that has high relevance to 
the PM literature. 
Findings/research limitations/implications: The paper challenges readers, 
PM academics and practitioners to view PM with a political perspective. This 
paper was delivered at the ICAN 2007 conference (which is the focus of this 
issue), which was entitled Mission Control: Power, knowledge and collaboration in 
project practice. 
Original/value: This paper triggers and sustains the debate about the 
influence of power and its unintended consequences that may affect projects.  
The review raises PM issues worthy of consideration that are often neglected. 
Paper Category: Research Note  
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Research Note 
Bent Flyvbjerg's books in English are Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of 
Ambition (Cambridge University Press, 2003), Making Social Science Matter 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001), and Rationality and Power: Democracy in 
Practice (The University of Chicago Press, 1998). Each of these books are highly 
significant contributions to knowledge in their respective fields, but Rationality and 
Power: Democracy in Practice exemplifies in many ways what is distinctive about 
Flyvbjerg’s work, as densely textured, ethnographically detailed, and theoretically 
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acute. Also, it is very close to my interests as a power theorist (Clegg 1975; 1989; 
Clegg et al 2006). 
Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice is a detailed case study of planning 
intended to limit the use of cars in the city centre of the city of Aalborg in Denmark. 
Soon after its initiation, several agencies, trade unions, police, local and national 
consultants, the business community, private corporations, the media, and interested 
citizens became involved in order to decide on issues such as redirecting traffic by 
creating a rational local and national bus traffic system. A task force was established 
to formulate a three-year plan. The first conflict arose between architects and the bus 
company over the location and size of a bus terminal. Originally just a minor 
disagreement, the discussion turned into embittered conflict and division among the 
main players.  There was a public hearing and the production of a counter-plan by the 
Aalborg Chamber of Industry and Commerce, which produced a revised plan that was 
approved in 1980.  
 
Small business people with retail outlets in the planning precinct grew increasingly 
dissatisfied with the original urban renewal plan. Without a constant stream of cars 
coming in to the city centre they feared they would lose business. They succeeded in 
halving the original plan to construct the bus terminal. The Environmental Protection 
Agency then began to question the environmental hazards and impact of the proposed 
bus terminal, while another source of local conflict concerned a sub-plan designed to 
try and maintain the authentic charms of the old shopping streets. The Town Council 
forbade all non-retail businesses (banks, insurance companies, and offices) from 
occupying ground floor premises, to try and preserve the street’s character. However, 
non-retail business leaders were also present in the local Chamber of Industry and 
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Commerce, and they agitated against this plan. In its first four years the Aalborg Plan 
underwent six rounds of reconstruction and modification. Although the overall plan 
was never actually rejected, specific projects became more and more minute, as well 
as more problematic in content and scope, generating further subordinate and specific 
episodes of power between local factions: cyclists and planners; planners and small 
business people; motorists and public transport, and so on.  
 
Unexpected and unanticipated environmental contingencies had an impact on the 
project, such as the Mayor and several high-level local officials being jailed on 
bribery charges, thus challenging the overall legitimacy of the urban renewal plan. By 
this time the original plan had undergone its eleventh revision. The Chamber of 
Industry and Commerce reversed its original stand and began arguing that redirecting 
traffic would hurt businesses by causing falling revenues. However, the city council 
survey rejected this fear by revealing that retail profits were increasing. Meanwhile, 
new Social Democratic politicians came on the scene, deciding to bolster the urban 
renewal project by emphasizing positive aspects of the original plan adopted a decade 
earlier, which led the Aalborg Project into a total impasse.  
  
The outcomes were not what any factions wanted:  instead of reducing car traffic, it 
increased by 8 percent; instead of creating an integrated system of bicycle paths, 
unconnected stretches were built; instead of reducing traffic accidents, the number of 
fatalities and injuries among cyclists increased 40 percent; instead of reducing noise 
the levels substantially exceeded Danish and international norms, and air pollution 
increased.   
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Flyvbjerg's (1998) main theme is that power shapes rationality. At various stages in 
the project the various political actors sought to steer the project through their 
preferences – they sought to structure what the circuits of power model terms 
obligatory passage points. Different claims were made for participation in different 
committees; differential participation produced different outcomes at different times, 
favoring different preferences. Small battles were fought over who, and what, could 
be introduced in which arenas and meetings. In this way the relations of meaning and 
membership in the various locales were contested, reproduced or transformed. As 
these changed then the obligatory passage points shifted; as these shifted the relations 
of power that had prevailed shifted also – most dramatically when the Mayor and 
officials were indicted and imprisoned. Thus, small wins in specific episodes of power 
had the capacity to shift the configuration of the overall circuitry through which 
power relations flowed. The actors engaged in the plans were constantly seeking to fix 
and re-fix specific schemes, and although the play of power was very fluid, the 
underlying social integration of the small business people with each other, the 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce, and the editorial views of the local newspaper, 
seemed to mean that the small business people were the prevailing winners in the 
many struggles. The attempts to re-specify the system integration of the traffic plan in 
Aalborg consistently foundered on the reef of social integration. How Aalborg was 
planned, designed and looked, as well as how it was not planned, not designed and did 
not look, was an effect of power relations. 
 
Flyvbjerg (1998) alerts us to one very important fact of power relations and 
rationalities: that when power and knowledge are entwined then the greater the power 
the less the need for rationality, in the sense of rational means-end justifications. The 
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relation between rationality and power was an uneven relation: power clearly 
dominated rationality. That is, those who presently configured power sought to 
continue doing so and were quite ready to define the reality of the project in any way 
that seemed to them to further their preferences, using whatever strategies and tactics 
were available to them. In this sense, what was defined as rationality and reality was 
an effect of power, as it defined and created ‘concrete physical, economic, ecological, 
and social realities’ (Flyvbjerg 1998: 227).  What was advanced and argued as 
rationality depended wholly on power relations; the more disadvantaged in these the 
agents were, the more they were liable to have recourse to conceptions of rationality 
that downplayed power, and sought to position themselves through factual, objective, 
reasoned knowledge. The most powerful rationalities took the form of rationalizations 
rather than authoritatively grounded accounts. Often these were public performance of 
rationality which other agents who were witness to the rationalizations felt compelled 
not to reveal it because they lacked the powers to do so; they anticipated and feared 
the reaction that their actions would in all probability produce, should they move, 
dangers lurked in open conflict and identification of differences. 
 
The greater the facility with which agencies could have recourse to power relations 
the less concerned they were with reason, and the less they were held accountable to 
it. Access to more power produced less reason. As an aside, those who have witnessed 
recent events in the federal election sphere may detect some similarities
1
. In Aalborg, 
what was most typical was the constant attention to the small things of power 
relations that continually reproduced the status quo; rather than attempts at 
transformation, it was largely reproduction that prevailed – and the most skilled 
                                                 
1
 This refers to the Australian November 2007 Federal election. 
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strategists of power were those for whom reproduction was their preferred strategy – 
in the case of Aalborg, the small business community, whose institutionalized voice 
was much more actively represented to governmental rationality than that of the 
various citizen groups: the cyclists, greens and so on. In turn, these relations were 
embedded in deeply held local loyalties and relations. When, in openly antagonistic 
settings, these relations came up against contra-points of view that were well 
researched and represented in rational terms, power-to-power relations dominated 
over those defined in terms of knowledge or rationality against power.  
Mostly, power relations were both stable and inequitable. Where power relations 
could be maintained as stable and characterized by consensus and negotiations, 
rationality could gain a greater toehold; the more power relations became 
antagonistic, the easier it was to deploy arguments and strategies that elided it. Thus, 
rationality must remain within the existing circuits of power if it is to influence them. 
To challenge them is to play a losing hand.   
Reading Flyvbjerg is important because it takes us into the heart of projects as 
political processes as well as into the contexts in which their design is brought into 
being through processes of becoming: how dreams become designs, designs become 
concrete, and interests become embedded in the processes that surround these acts of 
becoming. All project managers and researchers of project management need to read 
Flyvbjerg if only to have a reality check that immunizes them against the overly linear 
and rational thinking that they will ordinarily encounter in the project sphere. 
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